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AI-'BERT 'l'UHNER, Appellant, v. TEVIS MELLON et al., 
Defendants; WESTERN UNION 'rELEGRAPH COM-
pANY (a Corporation), Hespondent. 
11] Master and Servant-Liability to Third Persons-Actions-
AppeaL--Where trial court in action against employe and his 
employer for false arrest and imprisonment denied employe's 
motion for judgment notwithstanding a verdict for plaintiff 
and granted employer's similar motion, employe's failure to 
appeal does not preclude appellate court, on plaintiff's appeal 
from judgment in employer's favor, from examining correct-
neHs of finding that employe was liable, since any liability of 
employer would necessarily depend on whether its agent com-
mitted a tort in and as part of transaction of business of 
agency, and employer on such appeal is not precluded from 
disputing every element of that liability. 
[2] False Imprisonment--Persons Liable.-To charge a person 
with liability for false imprisonment arising out of an un-
lawful arrest, it must appear that he took some active part in 
bringing about the unlawful arrest, and he is not liable if, 
acting in good faith, he merely gave information to the 
authorities. 
[3] !d.-Persons Liable.-Where branch manager of defendant 
employer merely reported commission of robberies and stated 
to police officers his honest but mistaken belief that plaintiff 
was the person who robbed him of his employer's funds on four 
previous occasions, such conduct did not in law amount to 
taking some active part in bringing about the unlawful arrest, 
and hence neither he nor his employer, whose only liability 
would necessarily rest on doctrine of respondeat superior, is 
liable therefor. 
[ 4] !d.-Persons Liable.-A citizen who has been criminally 
wronged n1cay, without fear of civil reprisal for an honest mis-
take, report to the police or public prosecutor the facts of 
the crime and in good faith, without malice, identify to the 
best of his ability to such officers the perpetrator of the crime; 
he should not be held to the responsibility of a guarantor of 
the accuracy of his identification. (Disapproving implications 
to contrary in Turner v. Elliott, 91 Cal.App.2d 901, 904, 206 
P.2d 48.) 
[2] See Cal.Jur., False Imprisonment, § 6; Am.Jur., False Im-
prisonment, § 30 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Master and Servant,§ 219; [2-4] False 
Imprisonment, § 8. 
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the 
City and County of San Francisco. Robert L. Me Williams, 
Judge. Affirmed. 
Action against employer and employe for false arrest and 
false imprisonment. Judgment for defendant employer not-
withstanding a verdict for plaintiff, affirmed. 
William J. Connolly for Appellant. 
Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, John A.. Sutro, Francis N. 
Marshall and Harry C. Scott for Respondent. 
SCHAUER, J.-Plaintiff sued Tevis Mellon and Western 
Union Telegraph Company, Mellon's employer, for false 
arrest and false imprisonment. A. jury returned its verdict 
in favor of plaintiff as against both defendants. The motion 
of defendant Mellon for judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict was denied and that of defendant Western Union was 
granted. Plaintiff appeals from the ensuing judgment in 
favor of Western Union; Mellon has not appealed from the 
judgment against him. We have concluded that the judgment 
appealed from should be affirmed. 
[1] Although, as will hereinafter appear, the trial court 
should have granted Mellon's motion for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict, Mellon's failure to appeal does not 
prevent our examining the correctness of the finding that 
he was liable, for any liability of Western Union would 
necessarily depend upon whether its agent Mellon committed 
a tort ''in and as a part of the transactions of the business 
of the agency" (Deevy v. Tassi (1942), 21 Cal.2d 109, 125 
[130 P.2d 389]), and Western Union, defending on appeal 
the judgment in its favor in the action in which the liability 
of Mellon was first placed in issue, is not precluded irom 
disputing every element of that liability. 
Mellon was branch manager of a Western Union office on 
the street floor of the Sheldon Building in San Francisco. 
His hours of employment were from 2 p. m. to 10 :30 p. m. 
After 6 p. m. he was the only employe on duty in the office. 
During the three months prior to April 8, 1949, the date 
of plaintiff's arrest, Mellon had been robbed of company funds 
on four occasions, by the same person, at hours varying from 
5 :20 to 10 :15 p. m. Mellon had been expressly and repeatedly 
instructed that his duties included the safeguarding of com-
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pany funds; a company bulletin stated that upon discovery 
of a theft of such funds a manager should ''Notify the local 
police authorities and secure their co-operation in finding 
the thief." Mellon or his superintendent reported each of 
the four robberies to the police. After the fourth robbery 
the superintendent arranged for installation of an alarm 
system to summon the police, and plainclothes men were 
stationed in the building each night after 6 p. m. 
On April 8 at about 2 :30 p. m. Mellon observed plain-
tiff walk past the Western Union office, then retrace his 
steps and, according to Mellon's answer, "evince an unusual 
interest in the premises.'' The jury impliedly found, on 
sufficient evidence, that plaintiff, on legitimate business, was 
looking for the office of a firm which was in the Sheldon 
Building. Plaintiff, according to Mellon, "looked very much 
like the man that had been holding me up." Mellon tele-
phoned the police and reported, ''I saw the robber pass the 
office, or a man that looked like him.'' Mellon got into the 
police car with the officer who first arrived, rode along 
Market Street for about half a block, saw plaintiff, and 
said, ''There is the man I was speaking of.'' A. number of 
other officers arrived. According to Mellon, "never at any 
time did I positively identify him [plaintiff]. I told them 
he resembled the man very much.'' But according to plaintiff, 
Mellon in responding to an officer's statement, "If he is who 
you think he is, we will take him," said, "Yes, that is the 
man.'' 
Plaintiff was arrested, taken to jail, and held until the 
next day. Mellon then talked with and carefully observed 
plaintiff and described the ensuing events as follows: "They 
[the police] told me to sign the complaint, if I was positive 
of the identification. . . . 
"Q. But you got a good close look at him this time? A.. Yes. 
'' Q. A.nd you were convinced it wasn't the man f A.. I 
wasn't one hundred per cent convinced, because there was 
such a striking resemblance. 
"Q. Did you ask him to say anything? A.. Yes. 
'' Q. To identify his voice? A.. That's right. 
'' Q. Did you ask him to turn in different positions? A.. That 
is right. 
"Q. A.nd after that was done, you weren't sure, is that 
right? .A. That is right. 
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"Q. And you didn't sign a complaint1 A. No, sir .... 
I decided that, as long as there was some doubt in my mind 
about him being the man, I would rather not make a mistake.'' 
Plaintiff was then released. Two nights later Mellon was 
again robbed by the same person who had committed the 
four previous crimes. Shortly thereafter Mellon resigned 
his position with Western Union because he "couldn't stand 
the suspense. '' 
[2] It is settled law "that the defendant must have taken 
some active part in bringing about the unlawful arrest and 
that he is not liable if, acting in good faith, he merely 
gives information to the authorities. [Citations.] . . . [I] t 
would be unjust to impose liability for an honest mistake in 
identification even where the identification may have been 
the principal cause of the wrongful arrest." (Hughes v. Oreb 
(1951), 36 Cal.2d 854, 859 [228 P.2d 550].) As is pointed out 
in Miller v. Fano (1901), 134 Cal. 103, 107 [66 P. 183] (and 
also in the Hughes case, supra), "it would be a hard and 
unjust law that would hold a party responsible in damages 
for false imprisonment for an honest mistake as to the 
identity of a party." [3] All that Mellon did here was to 
report the commission of the crimes and state to the police 
officers his honest but mistaken opinion that plaintiff was 
the robber. This conduct did not in law amount to taking 
''some active part in bringing about the unlawful arrest,'' 
and since Mellon did not participate in the false imprisonment 
neither he nor his employer, whose only liability would 
necessarily rest on the doctrine of respondeat superior, is 
liable therefor. 
[4] Plaintiff relies upon Turner v. Elliott (1949), 91 
Cal.App.2d 901, 904 [206 P.2d 48], wherein understandable 
and commendable concern is shown for the victims of mistaken 
identification and ensuing false arrest. We share this concern 
but we think that proper concern for the victim in such a 
case must stop at some point along the line where to support 
his claims further would contravene the public interest. We 
think it serves the public interest-and, hence, the line should 
be drawn here-that citizens who have been criminally 
wronged may, without fear of civil reprisal for an honest 
mistake, report to the police or public prosecutor the facts 
of the crime and in good faith, without malice, identify to 
the best of their ability to such public officers the perpetrator 
of the crime. Investigation and action from then on are 
the responsibility of the public employes who are skilled in 
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that work and who are paid to perform it. The victims of 
crimes should not be held to the responsibility of guarantors 
of the accuracy of their identifications. 
The Turner case, as indicated above, was a false arrest 
action and in it judgments for plaintiffs were affirmed upon 
the stated ground that the defendant actively participated 
in the arrests because the evidence showed that he "was a 
victim of the robbery, caused the police to be summoned, 
pointed out [plaintiffs] Butcher and Moore, stated that they 
were the men who had robbed him, and when [plaintiff] 
Turner interceded he directed the officers to arrest Turner 
also. Without his activities there would have been no identi-
fication of the plaintiffs and no arrests.'' The Turner case 
purports to distinguish the Miller case ( 1901), supra, 134 Cal. 
103, upon the ground that the facts in Miller "bear no re-
semblance to the circumstances of the arrests of plaintiffs 
herein.'' \Vhile there are differences between the facts of 
the two cases, at least in respect to Turner, there are also 
implications in the above quoted language of the Turner case 
which are contrary to the Miller case and also to the Hughes 
case. Such contrary implications of the Turner case are dis-
approved. A view contrary to that of the Miller and Hughes 
cases would, we think, inevitably tend to discourage a private 
citizen from imparting information of a tentative, honest be-
lief to the police and, hence, would contravene the public in-
terest which must control. 
Plaintiff also relies upon Nelson v. Kellogg (1912), 162 Cal. 
621, 624 [123 P. 1115, Ann. Cas. 1913D 759], where it is said 
that "the defense of probable cause is not applicable in actions 
for false imprisonment." In view of our conclusion that Mel-
lon's conduct, as a matter of law, did not amount to participa-
tion in the arrest, we do not reach the question of probable 
cause. Our conclusion also obviates the need for discussion of 
the question whether Mellon was acting in the scope and 
course of his employment so as to render Western Union 
liable for his acts. 
For the reasons above stated the judgment appealed from 
is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, ,T., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., 
concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
On the theory that bad court decisions like bad kings are 
good for us if they are bad enough, the majority decision 
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in this case casts ominous shadows of such dire consequences 
in the realm of human rights and the dignity of man that those 
who believe in the American concept of liberty and justice 
may rise in defense of that concept and become so articulate 
that decisions such as this cannot stand as the law of this 
state. 
There can be no doubt that under the rule here announced, 
the right of the individual to the enjoyment of life, liberty 
and the pursuit of happiness is not only abridged, it is de-
stroyed. The right of a person who has done no wrong-
violated no law-injured no one-to walk along a public street 
in a dignified, respectable manner without fear of arrest and 
imprisonment no longer exists in this state. The dignity and 
security of the individual citizen is subordinated to the whim 
and caprice of any fanatical overzealous person who chooses 
to point a finger of suspicion at him and thereby cause his 
arrest and imprisonment without written charge, complaint 
or warrant of arrest. 
The concept of the majority appears to be that the detec-
tion of crime and apprehension of criminals is of greater 
importance to society than the right of innocent, law-abiding 
persons to live in peace and security and be free from arrest 
and imprisonment unless there is reasonable and probable 
cause for the belief that such person has committed a crime. 
'This concept is diametrically opposed to that on which this 
government was founded and is akin to the totalitarian con-
cept that the citizen is a mere pawn of the state and all his 
rights must yield to what may be considered in the interest 
of the state-hence, he may be arrested and imprisoned with-
out probable cause and is entitled to no redress for the injury 
suffered as the result of the ignominious indignity inflicted 
upon him. 
The majority opinion is not supportable on any theory 
therein advanced or otherwise. It fails to give sensible mean-
ing to what constitutes actively participating in the arrest, 
confuses that question with good or bad faith and probable 
cause, omits facts in the record and th0se found by the jury, 
and is based upon a philosophy and policy wholly foreign to 
the fundamental principles of our government. 
Looking at the facts, we find defendant Mellon, employee 
of defendant corporation, was acting in the course of his em-
ployment when he actively procured plaintiff's arrest. That 
he acted in the course of his employment is clear from the 
able and learned opinion of Mr. Justice Fred Wood, speaking 
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for the District Court of A.ppeal when the case was there 
decided. (See Turner v. Mellon, (Cal..App.) 249 P.2d 41.) 
Plaintiff on entirely legitimate business walked by Western 
Union's premises and then returned and passed there again. 
Mellon, the employee, saw him and notified the police. The 
police responded to his call and he joined them in their patrol 
car and directed them down the street where plaintiff was 
walking. Mellon pointed out plaintiff as the person who had 
robbed him before. As the result of Mellon's assurances the 
police arrested plaintiff and took him to the police station. 
There again Mellon positively identified plaintiff as the rob-
ber of the Western Union office on four previous occasions. 
Mellon had described the person who had previously robbed 
him as being '' 5 feet 11 inches'' tall, weighing 150 pounds, 
and age 28. Plaintiff, on the other hand, was 6 feet and 
% inch tall and weighed 130 pounds, and was 39 years of 
age. Moreover, the jury had the opportunity of observing 
plaintiff on the stand and thus comparing the appearance he 
made with that given by Mellon of the robber. The four 
previous robberies had all occurred between 8 and 9 p. m., 
while Mellon's observation of plaintiff just before the arrest 
was at 2 :30 p. m. There was nothing unusual or suspicious 
about the actions of plaintiff at the time Mellon observed and 
identified him. I mention these factors because they supply 
an adequate basis upon which the jury could decide, as it did, 
that Mellon was acting either in bad faith or without probable 
cause. 
There can be no doubt that Mellon procured, actively par-
ticipated in and brought about plaintiff's arrest. On observ-
ing plaintiff walking along the street, he called the police. 
He directed them to the point where he had last seen plain-
tiff. He pointed plaintiff out as the person who had perpe-
trated the robberies. When the officers were reluctant to make 
the arrest, he assured them that plaintiff was the robber and 
on that basis alone the arrest was made. If that does not 
constitute a participation in the arrest-the procuring cause 
of it-then it is difficult to imagine a case that would. In 
Hughes v. Oreb [36 Cal.2d 854 (228 P.2d 550)], the defendant 
did nothing more than, in good faith, give information to the 
arresting officers. Here the evidence shows that Mellon was 
the sole procuring cause of plaintiff's arrest. The officers 
would not have arrested plaintiff except for Mellon's false 
but positive identification. 
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The majority opinion, however, concludes as a matter of 
law, repudiating the jury's contrary finding, that Mellon 
did not participate in the arrest. It makes that determination 
by giving to the participation element a meaning that ordi-
narily would be ascribed to probable cause. The latter factor, 
by that name, is said to be not involved because there was 
no participation in the arrest by Mellon. It first states the 
rule iterated in Hughes v. Oreb, supra, 36 Cal.2d' 854, 859 
[228 P.2d 550], that: "the defendant must have taken some 
active part in bringing about the unlawful arrest and that 
he is not liable if, acting in good faith, he merely gives in-
formation to the authorities ... every person is entitled to 
give information to the proper officers and that it would be 
unjust to impose liability for an honest mistake in identifica-
tion even where the identification may have been the principal 
cause of the wrongful arrest.'' Then, it concludes that Mellon's 
actions were in good faith, an honest but mistaken opinion 
as to identity and therefore he did not take an ''active 
part in bringing about the unlawful arrest.'' If the last 
quoted words are to be given a meaning that has any re-
semblance to their real sense, it is a non sequitur to state 
that a person did not take an active part in procuring the 
arrest of a person because he acted in good faith. His activity 
could be with good or bad faith but nevertheless be activity. 
Manifestly the majority is, by giving a completely foreign 
meaning to those words, using them to declare a public 
policy against holding a person liable for actively participat-
ing in an unlawful arrest where he acts honestly (later I 
will discuss the policy question) or, although it says probable 
cause is not involved, it is speaking of the same principle 
but calling it no participation because of good faith. In 
any event, as I have above pointed out, there was adequate 
evidence to show active procurement of the arrest and also 
bad faith, even accepting the terminology of the majority 
opinion. On the evidence the jury found the facts on those 
issues and this court cannot disturb that finding without 
thereby denying plaintiff's right to a jury trial, which it has 
done here. 
For cogent reasons the majority has excluded the issue 
of probable cause from its consideration. It is a vital issue 
in this case as it is in every case of false arrest. It must be 
conceded that any person who has probable cause to believe 
that a crime has been committed and that he knows the 
person guilty thereof, should report such facts to peace 
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officers to the end that persons who violate the law should 
be apprehended and punished. Probable cause has been de-
fined as a reasonable ground for suspicion, supported by 
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a 
cautious person in the belief that the person accused is guilty 
of the offense with which he is charged. The determination 
of what constitutes probable cause is and should be a question 
of fact. Therefore, the issue in this case was whether or 
not defendant Mellon had probable cause to believe that 
plaintiff had committed the four robberies of which defendant 
Mellon was aware. In determining whether or not defendant 
Mellon had probable cause to believe that plaintiff had com-
mitted said robberies, the trier of fact was required to 
consider all the facts in order to determine whether or not 
defendant Mellon acted as a reasonable and prudent person 
in identifying plaintiff as the robber and directing the police 
to arrest him. It must be assumed that the jury, as the 
trier of fact in this case, gave consideration to this issue 
and determined it adversely to defendant Mellon. Certainly 
every citizen who walks upon the street should not be sub-
jected to the whim and caprice of the fanatical, irrational 
person who might identify him as the perpetrator of a crime 
and subject such a person to arrest and imprisonment. Some 
standard should be adopted to protect innocent, law-abiding 
people from arrests of this character, and the only standard 
known to the law is that of probable cause. By refusing to 
consider this issue as an essential element in determining the 
reasonableness of the conduct of defendant Mellon in this 
case, the majority of this court has disregarded the only 
standard known to the law for the protection of innocent 
persons from unjustified arrests in cases such as this. 
Turner v. Elliott, 91 Cal.App.2d 901 [206 P.2d 48], over-
ruled by the majority opinion is precisely in point and 
sound law. The facts there are practically identical with 
the facts in the instant case and the court upheld the jury's 
verdict for plaintiff. (See cases to the same effect, 21 A.L.R. 
(2d) 643, 710.) 
As heretofore mentioned, the basic premise of the majority 
opinion is that to hold a person liable who by false identifica-
tion procures the arrest and imprisonment of another would 
''contravene public interest.'' The nature of the public interest 
or· poliey is not elucidated but it is not hard to discern. It 
is the policy of making it easier for the police to catch alleged 
criminals even at the expense of the innocent by false im-
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prisonment. That policy is and should be subordinate to the 
fundamental rights of individual freedom-principles which 
are imbedded in our Constitutions, state and federal. The 
policy declared by the majority makes the rights of individuals 
expendable on the chance that more criminals may be appre-
hended. The framers of the Constitution of the United States 
weighed that policy against those rights and took the calcu-
lated risk in favor of the latter. These principles have been 
enunciated repeatedly. In considering coerced confessions, it 
has been said, ''The rule [that confessions obtained for one 
crime while defendant was held in custody for another could 
validly be used at the trial for the first crime] I propose 
would, of course, reduce the 'efficiency' of the police. But so 
do the requirements for arraignment, the prohibition against 
coerced confessions, the right to bail, the jury trial, and most 
of our other procedural safeguards. We in this country, 
however, early made the choice-that the dignity and privacy 
of the individual were worth more to society than an all-
powerful police." (United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36, 
46 [72 S.Ct. 97, 96 L.Ed. 48], Douglas, J. dissenting; Black, 
J. and Frankfurter, J. joining.) It is forcefully put by Mr. 
Justice Black in Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 240 [60 
S.Ct. 472, 84 L.Ed. 716], also dealing with coerced confessions: 
''We are not impressed by the argument that law enforcement 
methods such as those under review are necessary to uphold 
our laws. The Constitution proscribes such lawless means 
irrespective of the end. And this argument flouts the basic 
principles that all people must stand on an equality before 
the bar of justice in every American court. Today, as in ages 
past, we are not without tragic proof that the exalted power 
of some governments to punish manufactured crime dicta-
torially is the handmaid of tyranny. Under our constitutional 
system, courts stand against any winds that blow as havens 
of refuge for those who might otherwise suffer because they 
are helpless, weak, outnumbered, or because they are non-
conforming victims of prejudice and public excitement. Due 
process of law, preserved for all by our Constitution, com-
mands that no such practice as that disclosed by this record 
shall send any accused to his death. No higher duty, no more 
solemn responsibility, rests upon this court, than that of 
translating into living law and maintaining this constitutional 
shield deliberately planned and inscribed for the benefit of 
every human being subject to our Constitution-of whatever 
race, creed or persuasion.'' The same thoughts have been 
May 1953] TURNER v. MELLON 
[ 41 C.2d 45; 257 P.2d 15] 
55 
expressed in cases dealing with arrests and searches and seiz-
ures. In United States v. DiRe, 332 U.S. 581 [68 S.Ct. 222, 
92 L.Ed. 210], Mr. Justice Jackson said at page 595: "We 
meet in this case, as in many, the appeal to necessity. It is 
said that if such arrests and searches cannot be made, law 
enforcement will be more difficult and uncertain. But the 
forefathers, after consulting the lessons of history, designed 
our Constitution to place obstacles in the way of a too per-
meating police surveillance, which they seemed to think was 
a greater danger to a free people than the escape of some 
criminals from punishment. Taking the law as it has been 
given to us, this arrest and search were beyond the lawful 
authority of those who executed them. The conviction based 
on evidence so obtained cannot stand." To the same effect 
is the declaration of Mr. Justice Douglas in McDonald v. 
United States, 335 U.S. 451, at page 455 [69 S.Ct. 191, 93 
L.Ed. 153] : "We are not dealing with formalities. The 
presence of a search warrant serves a high function. Absent 
some grave emergency, the Fourth Amendment has inter-
posed a magistrate between the-Ci.f.izen i:md thepOTice. This 
was done not to shield criminals nor to make the home a safe 
haven for illegal activities. It was done so that an objective 
mind might weigh the need to invade that privacy in order to 
enforce the law. The right of privacy was deemed too precious 
to entrust to the discretion of those whose job is the detection 
of crime and the arrest of criminals. Power is a heady thing; 
and history shows that the police acting on their own cannot 
be trusted. And so the Constitution requires a magistrate to 
pass on the desires of the police before they violate the privacy 
of the home. We cannot be true to that constitutional re-
quirement and excuse the absence of a search warrant without 
a showing by those who seek exemption from the constitutional 
mandate that the exigencies of the situation made that course 
imperative.'' The principles thus declared are not new. In 
1920, the late Mr. Justice Clarke, speaking for a unanimous 
court in Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, at page 303 
[41 S.Ct. 261, 65 L.Ed. 647], said: "It would not be possible 
to add to the emphasis with which the framers of our Con-
stitution and this court (in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 
616 [6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746], in Weeks v. United States, 232 
U.S. 383 [34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652], and in Silverthorne 
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 [40 S.Ct. 182, 
64 L,Ed. 319]), have declared the importance to political 
liberty and to the welfare of our country of the due observance 
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of the rights guaranteed under the Constitution by these two 
Amendments l.B'ourth and ]1-,ifth]. The effect of the decisions 
cited is: that such rights are declared to be indispensable to 
the 'full enjoyment of personal security, personal liberty and 
private property' ; that they are to be regarded as of the 
very essence of constitutional liberty; and that the guaranty 
of them is as important and as imperative as are the guar-
anties of the other fundamental rights of the individual citi-
zen,-the right to trial by jury, to the writ of habeas corpus, 
and to due process of law. It has been repeatedly decided that 
these Amendments should receive a liberal construction, so 
as to prevent stealthy encroachment upon or 'gradual de-
preciation' of the rights secured by them, by imperceptible 
praetice of courts or by well-intentioned but mistakenly 
over-zealous executive officers.'' ·while those cases were deal-
ing with unlawful acts of public peace officers, the funda-
mental principles are nevertheless relevant to the question of 
when civil liability should be imposed on an individual who 
unlawfully procures the arrest and imprisonment of another 
and thus causes those rights to be violated. In both cases, 
the person is unlawfully deprived of his liberty and for that 
he should be compensated. Indeed, the argument has been 
made many times by the proponents of the view that illegally 
obtained evidence cannot be excluded at the trial in the state 
courts, that the offended person has his civil remedy for dam-
ages, the clear implication being that that remedy is adequate. 
The majority opinion in this case demonstrates not only the 
inadequacy of such a remedy but concludes there is no remedy 
at all. 
Finally, I wish to state without qualification or reservation 
that in my opinion the inalienable rights to the enjoyment of 
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness guaranteed to all 
persons by our fundamental law are so precious that they 
constitute the sine qua non of the American way of life, and 
that any intrusion on or abridgement of those rights should 
not be tolerated by judges who have taken a solemn oath to 
support the Constitution of the United States and the Con-
stitution of the State of California; that a heavy burden 
should be cast upon the person who sets in motion any action 
or proceeding which results in a violation of such rights 
to justify his action; that the only justification of such an 
action or proceeding is that the person instigating the same 
has reasonable and probable cause to believe that the person 
whose rights are being invaded is guilty of a public offense; 
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and that in the absence of a showing of the existence of reason-
able and probable cause for the instigation of such action or 
proceeding, the person instigating the same should be liable 
in civil damages to the person injured regardless of the honesty 
or good faith of the instigator. If such a rule were announced 
by this court in this case, the judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict, rendered by the trial court would be reversed. In 
my opinion that should be the decision of this court. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied June 11, 
1953. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should 
be granted. 
[Crim No. 5338. In Bank. May 15, 1953.] 
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